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Block Exemptions 
The first 10-year Block Exemption was granted to European vehicle 
manufacturers in 1985, when it became clear that their exclusive 
vertical agreements with their franchised dealers contravened the 
Treaty of Rome. It was renewed without major change in 1995 for a 
further seven years. Both those regulations essentially accepted the 
manufacturers’ arguments and could almost have been written by 
them. But then the doubts crept in, as the manufacturers started to 
stretch the limits of acceptable behaviour. 
In 1998, VW was heavily fined by the European Commission for trying 
to prevent Italian consumers from buying cars in other European 
countries. It collected another huge fine in 2001 for price maintenance 
in the German market. In the late 1990s, the UK was known as 
Treasure Island in the industry, which collectively kept new cars prices 
there outrageously high. This was punctured by a combination of the 
Consumers Association, the House of Commons Trade and Industry 
Select Committee, the media (notably the Daily Mail) and a thorough 
investigation by the then Monopolies and Mergers Commission. This 
last identified the operation of what it called a complex monopoly, i.e. 
tacit passive collusion. Prices duly came down. In its 8-year BER of 
2002, the European Commission sought not only to redress the 
imbalance of power between manufacturers and their dealers but also 
– most crucially – to protect the independent aftermarket, so that 
consumers might continue to benefit from competition in service and 
repair, rather than being treated as captive customers by 
manufacturers and dealers. 
In the 2010 BER, the Commission backed off the first chapter, putting 
new car sales agreements under the looser general Block Exemption 
regime. But it kept up the pressure over the aftermarket, most 
particularly in the matter of equitable access to technical information 
for the independent trade. In 2019 it launched its review of the current 
MV-BER 461/2010, in order to assess its relevance, its coherence 
and its EU added value. Depending on its final evaluation, expected in 
May 2021, the European Commission will or will not consider 
prolonging the MV-BER after its expiry date in 2023. 
My guess is that a new BER will be issued, following essentially the 
same principles and with a continued emphasis on technical 
information, given the growing complexity of vehicle electronics, 
advanced driver information systems and vehicle manufacturers’ 
development of telematics-based services. As Neil Pattermore of 
Aftermarket On-Line put it in an article of January 2019, “although 
BER was revised in 2010, in practical terms, it did not change the 
basic problem of the ability for a small business to take legal action 
against a vehicle manufacturer if they did not provide access to e.g. 
technical information, when requested – a real ‘David and Goliath’ 
challenge. 
To address this problem, the European Commission decided to put 
the ‘access to repair and maintenance information’ (RMI) into Vehicle 
Type Approval Regulations, where it addressed the issue by changing 
the legal basis – still fundamentally a competition issue that supports 
non-discrimination – but now based on the vehicle manufacturer 
having to prove that access to the RMI was possible before they can 
achieve whole Vehicle Type Approval.” He goes on to say that the 
fundamental legislative issue is how to ensure safe and secure 
access to the vehicle and its data, to ensure that competition remains 
possible. 
Behaviour 
ACEA, the trade body of the European vehicle manufacturers, states 
that its member companies have adopted a code of good practice, 
concerning their agreements with their authorised distributors and 
repairers. This is part of a quid pro quo, to avoid further pressure on 
the part of the very powerful European regulator, which itself has to be 
mindful of the importance of the industry to Europe. But there leopard 
hasn’t really changed his spots. What can happen when that 
equilibrium is disrupted is illustrated by the case of Australia. Car 
manufacturing came to an end there in 2017, so the government no 
longer had an industry to protect and support (which it did through 
massive financial subsidies over 70 years). So did the dependence 
upon government of the manufacturers selling cars in Australia. 
The manufacturers’ voluntary agreement with the independent 
aftermarket sector (which supports 75-80% of the cars on the road) 
over the latter’s access to technical information was almost 
immediately dishonoured by a number of manufacturers. This brought 
in the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, which 
imposed a mandatory code of practice. The ACCC has also recently 
empowered dealer councils to act in concert in negotiating with 
manufacturers, which could significantly tilt the balance of power. GM 
has decided no longer to support the Holden brand, that former 
Australian icon, and is terminating its dealers in Australia. This has led 
to an inquiry by a Senate committee in Canberra into the terms 
offered those dealers, the scope of which has been widened to 
manufacturer-dealer relationships in general. 
Some of the voluntary submissions to the Senate inquiry make 
interesting reading. Mercedes Benz of Australia is moving to an 
agency model, whereby it will be the retailer (in particular owning the 
stock of cars in its network) and pay contractors to provide selling 
services. A very successful Honda dealer of 50 years’ standing 
describes how they and 30 others across the country have been 
arbitrarily cancelled out, again in favour of an agency system. The 
manufacturers remain adamant in their determination of control their 
retail distribution channels and financially critically dependent upon 
their ability to coerce customers into their dealers’ (or agents’) 
workshops. 
Brexit 
The UK has left the European Union and will, at best, secure a very 
weak trade deal with it. What does this portend for UK buyers and 
owners of motor vehicles? For the moment, not much. The UK 
Competition and Markets Authority has said that the EU Block 
Exemption Regulations would be retained in UK law. So it’s no 
change until 2023.  But what happens thereafter? Will the government 
fight for the consumer or give in to the demands of the 
manufacturers? Andrew Tyrie’s attempt to make the Competition and 
Markets Authority into a strong fighter for consumers with executive 
powers modelled on those of DG Competition in Brussels failed. Even 
with a stronger anti-trust and regulatory authority, the UK would be in 
a far weaker position to square off against giant global corporations 
than under the strong wing of Brussels. 
As a further complication, are we heading for the loss of our 
automotive industry, an Australian-type scenario? Honda is going. 
Nissan has now said that it’s large and very competitive Sunderland 
plant would no longer be viable in a No-Deal scenario. How long 
would Toyota remain under those circumstances? The dominant and 
Hayek-libertarian Brexiter wing of the Conservative Party and 
government is viscerally opposed to regulatory interventionism – a 
major reason for its detestation of the very interventionist EU. 
Are we now going to see a free-for-all, with the UK dropping restraints 
on manufacturers’ behaviour? Or, at the other extreme, exclusive 
vertical agreements disallowed? Or a tacit paralleling of what the EU 
chooses to do from 2023. Which is exactly what the UK government 
has been bitterly resisting during the negotiations over a trade 
agreement. Here we seen the consequences of that grand gesture 
without a plan, which Brexit is. 
